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INTRODUCTION 
   The Japanese financial system has undergone substantial changes since 
the mid-1970s. The changes in the financial system reflect its changing 
circumstances: a shift to stable economic growth and the accomplishment 
of rapid economic growth. The former has to do with an issue of huge 
governmental bonds and higher sensitivity to interest rate differentials, and 
the latter with an increase in financial assets and an increasing attractiveness 
of the Japanese market for foreigners. According to economists' explana-
tions, the financial revolutions took place because these economic circumst-
ances changed and financial institutions responded to them in order to 
survive. The changing needs of suppliers and users of funds were the major 
factors behind the introduction of new techniques and financial products. 
   The rate of introduction, however, was not necessarily synchronized to 
meet immediately the needs of the market. Demands were converted into 
policies through a political system. In this paper, we focus on political and 
administrative dimensions of the financial revolution. The problem is this: 
 * This paper was submitted to the Specialists Conference on the Japanese Government Industry 
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what roles have political and administrative actors played in these changes? 
   A few political scientists have examined financial developmentin Japan. 
James Home focused on the role of the LDP in the development of the 
financial system'). He identifies the commitment and influence of the LDP 
in several policy areas such as the establishment of government financial 
institutions, the maintenance of low interest rates and the continuation of 
a separate postal savings system2). In his view, politics functions as a buffer 
to slow down the general process of deregulation. He says, "In the more 
political areas change was often delayed by the fear that adjustment to the 
status quo could have a negative effect on the LDP's electoral backing."') 
   This paper, in contrast to Horne's opinion, will assert that financial 
changes were delayed because finance as a policy area had been depoliticized 
according to an agreement between the MOF and banks: The banking sector 
could not rely on the LDP to circumvent the MOF, which resulted in delay-
ed deregulation. Politics, in specific political leadership, promoted changes 
in the financial system. 
   Frances Rosenbluth examined three explanations of Japanese financial 
deregulation 4). The first explanation is that Japan is a reactive state, and the 
United States and several European states have gradually forced open Japan's 
closed financial door. The second is that the Ministry of Finance has 
compelled Japanese financial institutes to conform to changing world condi-
tions. A third explanation of Japan's deregulation holds that Liberal 
Democratic Party politicians are the key players. After looking into the 
deregulation process in detail, she concluded that "deregulation has been 
propelled by financial institutions, acting in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Finance and sometime politicians, to construct a new set of rules they 
need to compete in a changing economic environment"'). She uses financial 
deregulation as a vehicle for modeling the Japanese political system and her 
characterization resembles Richard Samuels's "reciprocal consent"') and 
Daniel Okimito's "network state" or "market conforming policy"'). 
 1) James Horne, Japan's Financial Market, 1985. 
2) James Horn, "Politics and the Japanese Financial System", inDynamics and Immobilist Politics 
    in Japan, ed. by J.A.A. Stockwin et. al., 1988 p. 172. 
3) Horne, "Politics and the Japanese Financial System", p. 198. 
4) Frances Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary J pan, 1989, pp. 2-4. See also, Frances 
   Rosenbluth, Political Economy of Japan's Financial Deregulation, Ph. D. dissertation f r 
   Columbia University, 1988. 
5) Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary J pan, p. 5. 
6) Richard Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State, 1986. 
7) Daniel Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market, 1989.
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   This paper will address different questions from Rosenbluth's works
which aim to identify the propelling forces in policy changes. That is, why 
were policy changes processed more slowly than market forces would have 
expected and why did they accelerated at a certain time? I will present my 
working hypothesis for answering those questions. 
  The MOF and the banking sector had made a pact to minimize the 
intrusion of politicians into financial policy making. Finance was the last 
policy area to be politicized. The apolitical pact had benefited both the 
MOF and banks. It protected the MOF's autonomy, elite status and jurisdic-
tional boundaries which the MOF gave the highest priority in its hierarchy 
of objectives8). Banks had no incentive to politicize financial policy making 
because the existing administration-dominant policy process secured suitable 
profits for them. Thus, this dominance by the MOF was actually the choice 
of the banking sector itself. 
   As the economic environment changed and banks began to call for 
changes in the system, however, the apolitical pact came to limit the activi-
ties of banks. It prohibited the banking sector from calling upon the power 
of political representatives. Given the negative stance of the MOF toward 
financial deregulation, there was left only the option for banks to resort to 
the LDP, but this meant breaking the apolitical pact with the MOF. It was 
risky conduct for them since they were strictly supervised by the MOF. 
Consequently, the banking sector was left with no choice but to follow the 
MOF's timetable for gradual deregulation, sometimes in conjunction with 
re-regulation. 
   In the end, the pact was broken by external forces in a way which was 
unexpected at least for the MOF: foreign pressures to open the Japanese 
financial system. Since then, the LDP and Prime Minister have entered the 
picture and helped realize the demands of the banking industry. At the 
present time, the MOF is in the process of reevaluating its strategy and 
restructuring its organization. 
   In this paper, I will examine the dynamics of the financial revolution in 
contemporary Japan in order to identify the limits of the MOF's dominance 
in financial policy making. 
8) John Campbell, Contemporary J panese Budget Politics, 1977, p. 111.
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1. Regulated Financial System 
   Before examining changes in economic circumstances and their impact 
on the financial system, we have to note the features of the Japanese 
financial system before the changes, that is in the high growth period. 
   The first feature is functional specialization. The Japanese financial 
system is segmented into several specialized sectors. The first line of division 
is drawn between the banking business and the securities business, by 
Article 65 of the Securities Exchange Law of 1947, modeled after the Glass-
Steagal Law of 1933 in the United States. The second is the division 
between short-term and long-term financing. While three long-term credit 
banks (the Japanese Long-Term Credit Bank, the Japanese Development 
Bank and the Export Import Bank of Japan) supply long-term funds to 
nonfinancial sectors by issuing bank debentures, other banks supply short-
term funds by gathering saving deposits. The third is the division between 
financing for big businesses and financing for small and medium-sized 
businesses and agriculture. Along this line, city banks, regional banks, 
mutual banks, credit associations and credit co-operatives are recognized. 
Moreover government financial institutions for small business were founded 
in order to solve the dual structure problem of the Japanese industrial 
structure.9) Among them, the People's Finance Corporation, the Small 
Business Finance Corporation and the Central Cooperative Bank for 
Commerce and Industry are important examples. 
   This specialization has been to some extent effective in preventing 
financial institutions in one sector from entering other sectors, thereby 
restraining intra- and intersectional competition. 10) 
  In this field of regulation, the tasks of the MOF are twofold. The first 
is to maintain the boundaries between sectors, which has been carried out 
not only by law, ordinances and other forms of guidance but also through 
management by separate organizations in the MOF11). The banking business 
is supervised by the Banking Bureau and the Security business by the Securi-
ty Bureau. In the Banking Bureau, in addition, there are three institution-
oriented divisions: the Division of Banking for city banks and regional banks, 
9) See Kent E. Carder, Crisis and Compensation, 1988, pp. 318-322. 
10) Hamada nd Horiuchi, "The Political Economy of the Financial Market", in The Political 
    Economy ofJapan, Vol. 1, ed. by Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, 1987, p. 235. 
11) James Horne, "Politics and the Japanese Financial System", p. 173.
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the Division of Special Finance for government financial institutions and 
the Division of Small and Medium Finance for mutual banks and credit 
associations and credit co-operatives. The second task is to keep order in 
respective financial subsectors. In the banking sector, the Banking Bureau 
controlled the rate of expansion of branches and the types of financial 
products. The regulation of interest rates prevented banks from competing 
with each other in the market. In the securities sector, the Securities Bureau 
also controlled the rate of expansion of branch networks, the rules of 
governing corporations' entry into the bond issue market, the character of 
the secondary bond market in some areas and the interest rate on bonds in 
the primary market. 
   The second feature of the Japanese financial system is regulation of 
interest rates. Interests rates have been regulated very comprehensively 
during the past three decades. Interest rates for bank deposits and short-
term bank loans are regulated by the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment 
Law enacted in 1947. Private banks fix the short-term prime rate at a 
constant margin above the official discount rate based on this law. Long-
term loan rates and bond-issue interest rate are, though not directly regulat-
ed by law, determined by an implicit cartel arrangement among large 
financial companies. In this field of regulation, the task of financial 
authorities is to fix several interest rates in narrow range. 
   Because of an artificially low interest rate policy, demand for funds 
always surpasses supply. The commercial banks could not satisfy all 
demands for industrial funds. The shortage of funds was alleviated by direct 
loan from the Bank of Japan(BOJ). This phenomenon is called "over-loan", 
which allowed the BOJ to use "window guidance" as major tool in the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
   As a result of the regulation of interest rates, banking sectors undertook 
no-price competition and used "compensating balance" (kosoku yokin). 
The expansion of branch offices was especially crucial to bank management. 
The more branches a bank develops, the more funds one gathers. Because 
the MOF officials were responsible for branch administration and determin-
ed number and geographic distribution of branch offices of each bank, they 
exerted powerful and important influence over the banking sector12). 
   The third and last feature is international isolation. The Japanese 
financial system was relatively isolated from the international market. 
12) Hamada and Horiuchi, op. cit., p. 237.
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During the high growth period, the Japanese monetary authorities closely 
regulated capital inflows and outflows in order to maintain sufficient levels 
of foreign reserves under the fixed exchange rate system. This control is a 
sufficient condition for the domestic regulations to work as expected. If the 
Japanese financial market was open to the foreign investors and the Japanese 
investors had easy access to the foreign markets, the regulated system could 
not endure. As T.J. Pempel has noted, in an era of high economic growth, 
the Japanese government served as a doorman between domestic society and 
the international arena, determining what could enter and leave Japan and 
on what conditions 13). While such control assuredly did not insulate Japan 
fully from international developments, it moderated its impact on the 
society. In financial sectors, however, isolation policy was more complete 
than in nonfinancial sectors. 
   Isolation policy in the financial sector along with other sectors was 
possible because Japan is a medium-size country. As Peter Katzenstein has 
mentioned, the European small countries, "because of their small size, are 
very dependent on world markets, and protectionism is therefore not a 
viable option for them."") In contrast, Japan could choose financial isola-
tion policy because it had a relatively large domestic market filled with more 
than one hundred million people with a high propensity toward deposit. 
At the same time it was neither so large nor attractive enough for foreign 
capital to be induced as it is now. 
2. Changing Circumstances 
   As for changes in economic circumstances, two points are important. 
The first is a shift to stable economic growth and the second is the ac-
complishment of rapid economic growth. 
   For many years after 1949, the general account of the national budget 
was based on a balanced-budget policy and not on long-term borrowing. In 
FY1965 the balanced-budget policy was abandoned, and long-term bonds 
were issued as a means to supplement tax revenues, which declined because 
of post-Tokyo Olympic recession. Until FY 1974, however, borrowing was 
only marginal source of revenue. The average bond dependency ratio was 
13) T.J. Pempel, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy", in Between Power and Plenty, ed. by Peter 
   Katzenstein, 1978, p. 159. 
14) Peter Katzenstein, Small Sates and World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, 1985, p. 24.
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about 10% from FY 1965 to FY 1974. 
   A significant change, however, occurred in the supplementary budget 
of FY 1975. Tax revenues dropped sharply because of the recession caused 
by the oil shock. Consequently, it became necessary to increase the bond 
dependency ratio from initial budget level of 9.4% to 25.3%15) 
   The scarcity of public bonds was crucial to the financial mechanism 
before 1975. Secondary markets for bonds were not developed and suitable 
substitutes for bank deposits were not introduced. The MOF prohibited the 
underwriters from selling national bonds on a secondary market because the 
MOF believed that the development of such a market would make it difficult 
to enforce the artificially high issue prices of national bonds on the syndicate 
of national bond underwriters. But the development of a secondary market 
became indispensable to the smooth absorption of a large volume of national 
bonds by the financial markets. The MOF unwillingly permitted members 
of a syndicate (banks and other financial institutions) to sell national bonds 
they had underwritten in 1977. 
   Because the government has issued 10-year-maturity bonds since 1975, 
large-scale government bond maturities arrive in and after 1985. City banks 
became aware of the impact of maturing bonds on their business around 
198016). That is, non-financial sectors can buy the bonds which will mature 
in a couple of years in the secondary market instead of savings media such 
as time deposits, if free interest rates on such bonds are higher than regulated 
interest rates on financial products supplied by banks. This concern led 
banks to re-examine the regulated interest rates system. 
   The second factor was increasing financial assets brought about by the 
accomplishment of high economic growth. The level of financial assets held 
by households and firms at the end of the Second World War was quite low. 
Because economies of scale are also applicable to financial transactions, they 
faced substantial transaction costs, which prevented them from diversifying 
their assets and greatly biased their portfolios toward both safe and divisible 
assets such as bank and postal savings deposits. Thus, the low level of ac-
cumulated financial assets and the associated transaction costs allowed the 
banking sector to become a predominant influence in postwar financial 
marketsl'). 
15) Yukio Noguchi, "Public Finance" inThe Political Economy ofJapan, vol. 1, p. 192. 
16) Saitho Seiichi, Gendai K n-yu Nyumon (An Introduction to Japan's Finance), 1985, p. 137. 
17) Hamada and Horiuchi, op. cit., pp. 229-230.
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   As financial assets were accumulated, both corporations and households 
became more sensitive to the profitability of the assets that they held. These 
changes expressed themselves in altered behaviour of corporations, house-
holds and the government with respect to financial transactions. In order to 
improve the efficiency of financial transactions, there was a greater need for 
methods of transaction that did not limit interest rates or participation. 
There rose the latent demand for financial innovations that sought to 
circumvent the regulations. 
3. Responses of Financial Sectors and Strategy of the MOF 
   Because corporations now held surplus funds, they sought to invest those 
funds efficiently through circumvention of deposit interest rate regulations. 
One method of doing this was to shift funds from three- to six-month time 
deposits into gensaki market (repurchasing agreement). This is the only 
short-term, negotiable instrument available to corporations with surplus 
funds. Although gensaki market had existed since late 1940s, it took a great 
leap around 1975. Maturing bonds were also becoming a substitute for time 
deposits in nonfinancial sectors. An innovation for smaller transactions, a 
medium-term government bond funds (Chukoku Funds) was also made. 
Chukoku Funds are liquid assets but also pay yields higher than those on 
short-term deposits. They were also an effective means by which households 
and small- and medium-sized corporations could circumvent interest rate 
regulations. 
   These new products reduced the ability of banks to gather deposits and 
caused a rapid decline in the role of banks in total financial intermediation, 
which drove them to introduce liberalized interest-bearing financial prod-
ucts. The larger city banks in particular, because they supplied funds to big 
companies with surplus funds to be absorbed in gensaki market and the 
secondary market of the national bonds, were eager to introduce counter-
products, certificates of deposite(CDs), which are negotiable deposits of up 
to six months' maturity with free interest rates, But the MOF at first (in the 
late 1960s) expressed no interest in their demand because deregulated 
interest rates might pose a threat to its control. 
  The position of the MOF had changed when the CDs debate was reacti-
vated in the late 1970s when the problem of maturing bonds became a 
reality. The shift in deposit shares and the significant expansion in govern-
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ment demand for funds in the bond market after 1975 led the MOF to 
support the introduction of CDs. In 1979, the banks introduced CDs. 
Although the Banking Bureau still supports the idea of regulated interest 
rates, the Budget Bureau, which was responsible for making the national 
budget and interested in enough revenue to finance the budget, became a 
more vocal supporter of interest rate deregulation. 18) An introduction of 
CDs reduced the meaning of interest rate regulations19) and strengthened 
competition between banks and securities companies. As a result there has 
been a partial relaxation of the segmentation of business between the two 
types of institutions. 
   Along with reducing segmentation between banking and securities, the 
MOF began to reconsider the separation between long- and short-term 
business. Under the Long-Term Credit Law, as mentioned before, only six 
financial institutions can issue five-year bank debentures whenever they 
need to raise long-term lending funds. Commercial banks are not allowed 
to float such debentures. The maximum term under which commercial 
banks can raise funds is three years. While commercial banks have become 
more dependent on long-term lending activity, banks are increasingly facing 
"mismatching" of maturities on deposits and loans
, which makes them more 
vulnerable to risks stemming from interest rate fluctuations. Commercial 
banks, in particular, city banks thus call for government measures them to 
enable them to freely issue fund-raising debentures. In opposition to 
ordinary banks' demands, the long-term credit banks point to the merits of 
specialization and division of labor and seek to the continuation of the 
regulations while stepping up their short-term loan business. The MOF at 
first responded negatively to the demands of the ordinary banks, and 
changed its position after the Yen-Dollar Committee met, as mentioned later 
in this paper. 
   The last issue was relaxation and abolition of foreign exchange regula-
tions. Pressure for the relaxation or abolition of exchange regulations gained 
strength with the increased incentives for international capital transactions 
that accompanied the shift to floating exchange rates in 1973. The MOF, 
however, did not take a positive stance on the internationalization of 
financial markets. They have retained many regulations that they felt were 
necessary to preserve the system of functional specialization in domestic 
18) Horne, "Politics and the Japanese Financial Politics", p.186. 
19) Yoshio Suzuki, The Japanese Financial System, 1987, pp. 46-47.
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financial markets. The Three-Bureau-Agreement is an example. In 1974, 
three bureaus in the MOF, Banking, Securities and International Finance, 
agreed to impose regulations on the underwriting activities of Japanese 
banks in foreign markets. These regulations corresponded to those in the 
domestic market separating securities activities from banking activities. 
Moreover, Japanese ordinary banks are prohibited from using, in Japan, 
funds acquired by issuing long-term liabilities in foreign markets. The 
purpose of this regulation is to support the position of long-term credit 
banks in domestic funancial markets.20) 
   Regulations were easedin stages after 1977, and the revised Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1980 liberalized all capital 
transactions in principle. In this issue also, more types of liberalization 
started after the Yen-Dollar Committee. 
   Some observers viewed the MOF as a promoter of financial deregulation 
and said that the MOF was deregulating Japan's financial markets because 
it deemed Japanese financial institutions now competitive enough both in 
the domestic and world economy to take advantage of freer financial 
markets. 
   The MOF, however, did not take a positive role in financial deregulation. 
First, the MOF had a negative stance toward the development of a secondary 
market for national bonds because as a budgeting authority it had to 
maintain the artificially high issue prices of national bonds21). Secondly, the 
MOF was at first disinterested in the demands of city banks to introduce 
CDs. It took almost ten years for the MOF to change their attitude toward 
the liberalization of interest rates. Thirdly, by the Three-Bureau-Agreement, 
the MOF decided to preserve the system of financial specialization. The 
MOF made only step-by-step concessions to the demands of financial 
institutions rather than initiating the change. In the view of the MOF, 
financial deregulation should be done at a slow pace so that it does not 
disturb domestic financial order. At the same time, deregulation should be 
compensated for with re-regulation. 
  Revision of the Banking Act in 1981 was an attempt by the MOF to 
change its de fact authorities in banking administration into de jure 
20) Hamada and Horiuchi, op. cit., p. 254. 
21) Masataka N kajima, Nihon no Kokusai Kanri Seisaku (The Japan's Policy for National Bonds 
   Management), 1977, chapter 7.
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authorities22). The old Banking Act was enacted in 1927 and was not revised 
even under the occupation. It was long-lived because MOF's regulatory 
policy came from its use of administrative guidance and the Banking Act 
served as only a guideline 23). In facing demands for domestic deregulation 
from the banking sector and making a partial concession to them, the MOF 
was driven to define in legal terms what it could do hereafter. 
   In short, the MOF was planning to deregulate the financial system at a 
moderate pace against banks' demands for rapid deregulation. The MOF's 
dominance over the financial administration made this possible. Financial 
policy process was apolitical by nature. It is highly technical, continuing 
from year to year unlike budgeting, and administered not by law but by 
administrative fiat. Keeping the financial policy process apolitical was, 
however, based on an agreement between the MOF and the banking sector. 
Certainly banks have been consistent contributors to the LDP, but they 
generally have avoided becoming too close to individual LDP politicians. 
In the views of banks, the LDP is important because it has maintained stable 
economic circumstances for the banking sector not because it supplies 
benefits to individual financial institutions. To commit an individual 
politician is rather risky and costly for banks. Consequently, the banking 
industry has been a less politicized arena than other industries. This 
prohibited banks from using the LDP to realize their requests. This negative 
attitude of banks toward political maneuvering also explains why when the 
MOF defined banks' rights to deal government bonds in the new Banking 
Law, banks received a disadvantageous treatment in comparison with 
securities. 
4. Economic Friction Problem: From Micro To Macro 
  Japan has a long history of trade friction problems with the U.S. It 
started with textile and footwear in the late 1960s, and moved to steel, color 
TVs and auto mobiles, before changing to semiconductor and super 
computer in 1980s. Issues of trade friction developed from labor intensive 
through capital intensive to knowledge intensive industries, as the "product 
cycle" theory suggests. Because high technology industry has a more 
22) The other purpose was to settle debate about legal interpretation f banks rights to engage in the 
   security business: types of securities operation i  which banks may participate. 
23) Tsuchida Masaaki, "Ginkouhou no Kaisei ni tuite", in Kin-yu (Finance) No. 411.
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strategic importance for the U.S. than for Japan, and because Japan has a 
comparative advantage in some items in this field, the trade friction will 
become more intensified. 
   Since 1981 when the balance of payment of the U.S. has deteriorated, 
the U.S. government has demanded the Japanese government open either 
the rice market or the financial market. These two sectors had been suppos-
ed to be "sacred cows" by respective reasons and therefore were left un-
touched as trading issue for a long time. 
   Agriculture is the cornerstone of the conservative ruling party in Japan 
as well as in other countries. With the process of economic modernization 
after the Second World War, the number of farmers has decreased drastically, 
but their importance for the LDP in elections has not decreased at the same 
pace as their number "because of the gerrymandered system of electoral 
districting' 121). The population in metropolitan districts exceeded 40% of 
the national total in 1984, but they elected only 100 out of the 511 seats 
in the Diet (less than 20%). By contrast, although eligible voters in the 
sector represented only about 20% of the national electorate, the districts 
in which they were located elected about 30% of the Diet. In spite of its 
relative small size agriculture is crucial to the LDP's majority. This simple 
fact will explain why trade frictions over agricultural products such as beef 
and oranges are politically hard to resolve 25). 
   If the aim of the U.S. governmentis to recover its trade imbalance, 
however, "beef and oranges" is not important by itself. Even with complete 
liberalization of the Japanese markets, exports from the U.S. to Japan would 
amount to only $500 million, which is marginal compared with the total 
amount of trade between the two countries, $40 billion in the late 1970s. 
Beef and oranges are not more than a symbol of closed Japanese markets. 
The true target of the U.S. in pressing Japan to open the markets for 
agricultural products was rice. 
   Although in any country financial industries are more heavily regulated 
than other industries, the Japanese financial system is one of the most 
strictly regulated one among all modern industrialized countries. Some 
observers state that the Japanese financial system has promoted economic 
development and her miracle may be explained at least partially by the 
24) Daniel Okimoto, "Political Inclusivity", in The Political Economy of Japan: Vol. 2, ed. by 
   Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, 1988, p. 327. 
25) I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato, ed. Coping with U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts, 1982, chapter 4.
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administrative manipulation such as window guidance possible under the 
regulated financial system26). Others argue that the financial system is the 
very driving force of high economic growth in postwar era Japan 21). In spite 
of obvious intervention by government into the financial system, however, 
finance has not become an agendum between the two countries for a long 
time. The MOF also thought that trade friction problems relating to finance 
were none of its business. 
   In the 1980s some industrialists in the U.S., however, combined an 
undervaluated yen with the strictly regulated Japanese financial system and 
complained that Japan government manipulated the exchange market to 
decrease the value of the Japanese currency, which led to expansion of the 
U.S. trade imbalance. Lee Morgan, chairman of Caterpillar Tractor, present-
ed the Solomon Paper to President Reagan in September 1983. Morgan told 
the President that his company and hundreds of others were losing billions 
of dollars worth of orders at home and abroad simply because a severely 
cheapened yen let Japanese competitors underprice them. The cheap yen, 
he asserted, was like giving Japanese exports as a 20% subsidy while putting 
a 20% tariff on American goods28). The paper entitled "Misalignment 
between Dollar and Yen" argued that the single most important cause of the 
U.S. trade imbalance was a prolonged misalignment of the currency 
exchange rate between the Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar, and the reason 
for the chronic undervaluation of the yen is a highly-regulated financial 
system in Japan which controls capital flows in order to maintain low 
interest rates domestically. One of the most important Japanese policies 
that affects exchange rate, the paper says, was regulated interest rates, which 
discouraged investment in Japanese securities by non-residents and en-
couraged residents of Japan to invest in foreign securities. A dispute on 
economic problems between two countries entered a new dimension: finance 
friction 29). 
   Which market, agriculture or finance, would become an agendum 
depended on the Japanese government's decision, and the Nakasone govern-
ment chose opening the financial market and deregulating the financial 
system. It was reported that Prime Minister Nakasone made a commitment 
26) Ira Magazine and Thomas Hout, Japanese Industrial Policy, 1980. 
27) John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth, 1983. 
28) The Japan Economic Journal, May 8, 1984. 
29) Heizo Takenaka nd Naoko Ishii, Nichibei Keizai Ronso (Japan-U. S. Economic Controversy), 
   1988, p, 44.
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to President Reagan to undertake liberalization measures in the financial 
markets by May30). Nakasone's choice was easy to understand. While 
farmers were opposed to opening the rice market, financial sector as a whole 
welcomed the internationalization of the Japanese financial markets. 
   Thus, the yen-dollar problem was treated as the most important 
economic issue between two countries when Reagan visited Japan in 
November 1983. A joint announcement by Finance Minister Noboru 
Takeshita and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan contained a number of 
concrete measures that would begin to deregulate the Japanese capital 
markets, increase the yen's use internationally, and help raise the value of 
the yen. Moreover two countries decided to establish the U.S.-Japan Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Yen-Dollar, to survey the progress of Japanese actions 
and to examine the additional possible actions by the Japan government. 
Mr. Nakasone urged Vice Finance Minister Tomomitsu Oba, co-chairman of 
the Yen-Dollar Committee to solve the finance friction problems immediate-
1y31). 
   In 1984, the Report of the Yen-Dollar Committee was issued, and broad 
measures for financial internationalization were adopted. The major points 
of the report were: 1) liberalization of interest rates on large denomination 
deposits within a course of two or three years; 2) abolition of the restric-
tions, on the conversion of foreign currencies into the yen; 3) granting 
approval to foreign banking institutions to enter the Japanese trust market 
on their own. 
   The single most significant thing in the announced measures was that the 
Japanese Government showed its schedule for liberalization of interest rates 
on large denomination deposits; in specific, to lower the minimum denomi-
nation of CDs from V300 million to ¥100 million by May of 1985. Another 
step was authorization of sale of MMCs. While the report cites liberalization 
of interest rates on small denomination deposits as an ultimate goal to be 
studied, it stresses the need to reconsider the present method to determine 
interest rates on postal savings if full liberalization of interest rates is to be 
achieved 32) 
30) The Japan Economic Journal, April 3, 1984. 
31) NihonKeizai Shimbun, November 11, 1984. 
32) The Japan Economic Journal, June 5, 1984.
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5. Acceleration of Liberalization 
   The Yen-Dollar Committee accelerated a pitch of liberalization of the 
Japanese financial system which had already launched by the domestic 
market forces. In interest regulations, the lot of free interest rate products 
was decreased. The minimum deposit for CDs was lowered to ¥300 million 
in January 1984, to ¥100 million in April 1985 and to V50 million in April 
1988. In 1985, money market certificates (MMCs) were introduced. MMCs 
had interest rates which were linked to those of CDs but were made available 
in units as little as Y50 million and thus had merit an asset for smaller 
investors. The minimum denomination was reduced to Y30 million in 
September 1986, to Y20 million in April 1987, to Y10 million in October 
1987 and to Y3 million in May 1989. Moreover, the maturities of CDs and 
MMCs were extended up to one years. 
   Barriers between banking and securities were removed in parallel with 
internationalization. Although banking and securities fields are strictly 
separated in Japan, Japanese banks are engaged in the securities business and 
securities companies in the banking business abroad. The countries having 
the system of universal banking, such as West Germany and Switzerland, 
take the Japanese regulations as "unfair" in terms of the principle of re-
ciprocity. Consequently, Article 65 of Securities and Exchange Law has 
come to draw considerable attention in Japan and abroad. An increasing 
number of European banks engaged in both banking and securities activities 
began to seek securities licenses in Japan. 
   In response to those complaints, December 1985, the MOF decided to 
give the go-ahead to the German bank on the condition that the bank's 
equity holding in the subsidiary in Japan did not exceed 50%33). This 
decision inevitably stipulated both other foreign banks interested in the 
Japanese market and the Japanese banks interested in the securities business. 
In these circumstances, in April 1986 for the first time city banks officially 
requested that the MOF conduct a review of Article 65 of the Securities and 
Exchange Law which prohibit banks from engaging in securities business34> 
They stated that Article 65 has more fulfilled its initial purpose of fostering 
the sound growth of Japan's securities industry and strongly suggested that 
the MOF remove the barriers separating banking and securities businesses. 
33) The Japan Economic Journal, December 7, 1985. 
34) The Japan Economic Journal, April 5, 1986.
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    They added that removing barriers was necessary from the international 
    viewpoint. 
      Accelerating liberalization had a substantial impace on the MOF. As 
   mentioned before, the MOF has its own strategy for deregulating the 
    financial system. First, deregulation should be done at a slow pace so that 
   it not disturb domestic financial order. Second, deregulation should be 
    compensated for by re-regulation. Reorganization of financial system was 
    done at MOF's pace to maintain its authorities over financial markets. The 
    Yen-Dollar Committee was a shock, upsetting its timetable for deregulation. 
    Still more, it had substantial meanings as far as the "institutional interest" 
    of the MOF. Deregulation, not followed by re-regulation, is a loss of powers. 
      In mid 1960's, MITI faced the same problem in capital liberalization 
   issue. When Japan joined the OECD in 1964, it had more reservations 
   to the OECD's capital liberalization code than any of the sixteen other 
    members except Spain and Portugal. There were many non-Japanesewho 
    criticized the Japanese for not having agreed to end restrictions on direct 
    foreign investment in the Japanese economy. Demands that Japan liberalize 
    were made in May 1965 at the Japanese-American Financial Leaders 
    Conference and again in July at the Japanese-American Joint Committee on 
   Trade and the Economy, and repeated again in February 1966 at the OECD 
   itself. But "the very thought of capital liberalization struck terror in the 
    hearts of MITI officials and Japanese industrial leaders....... [C] apital 
    liberalization meant competition at every level of an enterprise-intech-
    nology, capital resources, managerial skills, and all the rest. The low level of 
    capitalization of Japanese firms, a consequence of the Korean War period, 
    made them easy targets for foreign acquisition. The issue, of course, was 
    nationalistic rather than economic. .,,35) The issue was at the same time an 
    administrative one. In the process of trade liberalization, MITI had lost 
    powers it had exerted over the industries. Capital liberalization inevitably 
   accelerated the trend toward degrading the authority of MITI in the 
    Japanese economy. It was the Special Measures Law for the Promotion of 
   Designated Industries that the MITI tried to introduce in order to regain the 
    powers over the nonfinancial industries. 
      There is, however, an important difference between MITI and the MOF 
   facing the liberalization problem. In the case of trade and capital liberaliza-
     35) Chalmers Johnson, MITI and The Japanese Miracle, 1982, p. 276.
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tion, the industries shared the terror with MITI while the financial institu-
tions rather welcomed financial liberalization. Some American officials and 
bankers, it is alleged, believed their biggest ally against the MOF in the 
liberalization effort was the private financial community of Japan. Former 
Reagan National Security Council economic official Norman Baily com-
mented, "With the very strong exception of the pension fund issue, our 
position on deregulation has the support of the major Japanese private 
financial institutions; they also want to make Tokyo an international 
financial center. Only the MOF opposes this trend, because they fear it 
would lessen their control over the economic life of the country." 36) 
Conclusion 
   The U.S. government pressed the Japanese government o deregulate the 
Japanese financial system and the Nakasone Administration decided to 
follow the American demand. This meant that the apolitical pact was 
dissolved by external forces. As a result, the banking sector could call upon 
the LDP with less reserve toward the MOF whenever they needed to do so. 
Because the banking sector has demanded more rapid deregulation, the MOF 
was forced to re-examine its original strategy. 
   Although we don't have clear insights into the future development of 
the MOF's strategy, several points can be identified. 
   (1) The MOF seems to use any chance to enlarge the number of available 
posts in private banks which will decrease if left as it is37). Of the 13 major 
ministries, the MOF has maintained by far the most prominent positions in 
influential governmental organizations, affiliates and big businesses. As of 
December 1983, 38% of the total 754 known MOF officials who left the 
ministry and sought a second career, assumed posts in prestigious financial 
institutions. They include the head of the BOJ, the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan, the Japan Development Bank, Smaller Business Finance Corp., and 
some city banks, regional banks, mutual banks, securities and insurance 
firms. As for government affiliates, because the government has moved to 
steamline government-affiliated institutions as part of administrative reform, 
36) The Japan Economic Journal, May 8, 1984. 
37) On the function of amakudari in the Japanese political economy, see Kent Calder "Elites in an 
    Equalizing Role: Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government-
   Business Relationship", n Comparative Politics, July 1989.
18 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 37: 1 
the MOF has been facing increasing difficulties in securing posts for its 
high-ranking officials coming up for retirement38). Financial deregulation 
inevitably accelerates this trend. 
   A good example is an issue of the status conversion of mutual banks. 
Although the National Association of Mutual Banks sought a simultaneous 
switch of status for all its 68 member institution, the MOF didn't approve 
this demand. A simultaneous switch would be done on the objective rules 
and therefore would have deprived the MOF of discretions, which could be 
utilized for obtaining amakudari posts in converting banks. After a series of 
tough negotiations with the MOF, the National Association changed its 
policy and decided on a group-based conversion policy: a simultaneous 
conversion only for banks which were ready to change at the time. 
   (2) Deregulation is bringing forth new markets such as finance futures, 
offshore markets, commercial paper markets and option trading. With the 
barriers separating sectors being removed and several kinds of institutions 
including non-financial sectors entering the new markets, the MOF if busy 
arranging the conditions and circumstances of these new markets. They are 
looking for areas to re-regulate. 
  (3) Along with the birth of new markets, institution-oriented divisions 
in the MOF, such as the Banking Bureau, the Securities Bureau and so on, 
will go out of date. In the case of MITI, it abandoned the vertical industrial 
bureau oriented micro polices in favor of horizontal functional bureau 
oriented to macro policies in 1973 in response to internationalization 31). 
The MOF also will have to reorganize its institution-oriented bureaus and 
divisions into market-oriented bureaus and divisions sooner or later. 
38) The Japan Economic Journal, May 31, 1988. 
39) Johnson, op. cit., p. 290.
